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CONSIDERING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
NONSTATE INTERVENORS IN ORIGINAL
JURISDICTION ACTIONS
John C. Sullivan*
One of these things is not like the others,
One of these things just doesn't belong,
Can you tell which thing is not like the others
By the time I finish my song?1
INTRODUCTION
It is not often that one begins to hum a familiar Sesame Street
tune when reading Supreme Court opinions-but with Chief Justice
John Roberts, you never know what you might get. His dissent in Ala-
bama v. North Carolina2 begins with a not-so-subtle jab, based on the
children's game "One of these things is not like the others," that the
question of allowing nonstate party intervenors in an original jurisdic-
tion case in the Supreme Court should not have been a hard one.3
But could the answer really be that simple?
To address the question of intervenors, original jurisdiction itself
must first be considered. Article III's language is familiar: "In all
Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, 2012, Notre Dame Law School. This Note is
dedicated to my family: words cannot convey how blessed I am. I would like to thank
Professors AnthonyJ. Bellia, William K. Kelley, andJay Tidmarsh for their instruction
and guidance on this project-I am a better student and person for knowing them.
Finally, thank you to the Notre Dame Law Review for excellent editing assistance; any
errors that remain must be mine.
1 METRO LYRics, http://www.metrolyrics.com/one-of-these-things-is-not-like-the-
others-lyrics-sesame-street.html (last visited Aug. 13, 2011).
2 130 S. Ct. 2295 (2010).
3 See id. at 2317 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("The
parties to this case are Alabama, Florida, North Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, and the
Southeast Interstate Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management Commission. One of
these things is not like the others .... Our Constitution does not countenance such
'no harm, no foul' jurisdiction ....").
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those in which a State shall be a Party, the supreme Court shall have
original Jurisdiction. ' 4 However, as both a practical and statutory mat-
ter, "the Supreme Court [obviously] does not have original jurisdic-
tion over every case in which a state is a party.' '5 Rather than
remaining completely open-ended concerning cases involving states,
this jurisdiction has been limited by Congress6 to (1) controversies
between states, (2) controversies between the United States and a
state (in response to the decision in United States v. Texas7), and (3)
cases where a state sues the citizens of another state. 8 This also com-
ports with the Court's understanding of its role.9 Noticeably absent
4 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
5 EUGENE GRESSMAN ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 610 (BNA Books 9th ed.
2007) (emphasis added).
6 This enterprise is not beyond doubt. Given the express textual provisions of
Article III, it can be argued that the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court does
not need a statutory grant to be in force. See, e.g., Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S.
226, 234 (1922) ("Only the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is derived directly from
the Constitution. Every other court created by the general government derives its
jurisdiction wholly from the authority of Congress."); cf. Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-
Federalist View of Article III: Separating the Two Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REv.
205, 232 (1985) ("Read together, the first three Articles of the Constitution establish
three equal and co-ordinate branches of federal government, each of which derives its
power not from the other branches, but from the Constitution itself.").
7 143 U.S. 621 (1892) (holding that the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction
included cases between the United States and a state).
8 See 28 U.S.C. § 1251 (2006):
(a) The Supreme Court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction of all
controversies between two or more States.
(b) The Supreme Court shall have original but not exclusive jurisdiction of:
(1) All actions or proceedings to which ambassadors, other public min-
isters, consuls, or vice consuls of foreign states are parties;
(2) All controversies between the United States and a State;
(3) All actions or proceedings by a State against the citizens of another
State or against aliens.
9 See, e.g., South Carolina v. North Carolina, 130 S. Ct. 854, 861 (2010) ("Article
III, § 2, of the Constitution expressly contemplates suits 'between a State and Citizens
of another State' as falling within our original jurisdiction ...." (referencing Georgia
v. Brailsford, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 402 (1792))); see also GREssMAN ET AL., supra note 5, at
617 ("[T]he Supreme Court since 1939 has declined to exercise jurisdiction in some
original cases where lower federal courts had concurrent jurisdiction. Although the
statutory provision calling for original and exclusive Supreme Court jurisdiction of all
controversies between states, 28 U.S.C. §1251 (a), would seem to mean that the Court
is obligated to hear and decide all such cases, the Court has since 1976 declined to
exercise original jurisdiction even in some controversies between the states. Arizona
v. New Mexico, 425 U.S. 794 (1976). Due to its perception of its role and the magni-
tude of its workload, the Court has exercised discretion in accepting original cases
whether its jurisdiction is exclusive or concurrent." (citation omitted)).
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from this grouping of scenarios is the possibility of a citizen suing a
state. Though Article III could encompass such jurisdiction, the
Supreme Court has controversially determined that, once Chisholm
was allowed to sue Georgia, 0 the ratification of the Eleventh Amend-
ment 1 ensured that a citizen could not sue a state in federal court
under any circumstances-let alone in an original action of the
Supreme Court.12
10 Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
11 U.S. CONST. amend. XI ("The Judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against
one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any
Foreign State.").
12 The interpretation of the Amendment was expanded (or brought into con-
formity with the background assumptions of the Constitution, depending on how one
views it) to include a proscription on citizens suing their own state on a federal ques-
tion in Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890), and confirmed, over a vigorous dissent by
Justice Souter, in Seminole Tribe v. Forida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996). It has been argued that
Hans was in line with the background assumption, present at the time of the founding
and the ratification of the Eleventh Amendment, that the Constitution did not
authorize citizens to sue their own states. See Bradford R. Clark, The Eleventh Amend-
ment and the Nature of the Union, 123 HARV. L. REv. 1817, 1895 (2010) ("Thus, whether
a suit arises under state law, general law, or federal law, the Amendment-by its
terms-prohibits federal courts from hearing any suit brought by a prohibited plain-
tiff against a state."); Alfred Hill, In Defense of Our Law of Sovereign Immunity, 42 B.C. L.
REv. 485, 489 (2001) ("[W]hen adopted, the Constitution was understood as embody-
ing an understanding that the federal and state governments were free to invoke the
doctrine of sovereign immunity for themselves, even if this meant that rights given by
the federal Constitution would go unenforced.").
This point, though, is not without dispute. SeeAtascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon,
473 U.S. 234, 260 (1985) (Brennan,J., dissenting) ("The early history of the Constitu-
tion reveals, however, that the Court in Hans was mistaken. The unamended Article
III was often read to the contrary to prohibit ... the assertion of state sovereign
immunity as a defense, even in cases arising solely under state law."); William A.
Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow Construction of an
Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather than a Prohibition Against Jurisdiction, 35 STAN. L.
REv. 1033, 1033-34 (1983) ("The Court apparently views the amendment as a form of
jurisdictional bar that specifically limits the power of federal courts to hear private
citizens' suits against unconsenting states.... [Tlhis view of the amendment is mis-
taken.... [T] he amendment merely required a narrow construction of constitutional
language affirmatively authorizing federal court jurisdiction and . . . did nothing to
prohibit federal court jurisdiction."); John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and
State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 1889, 1893 (1983) ("[A]
peculiar and temporary set of political circumstances led the Supreme Court, in one
of the boldest examples of judicial activism in its history, to rewrite the amendment,
giving it a meaning [in Hans] that its framers never intended it to have.").
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As it stands, the Supreme Court hears original jurisdiction actions
on an almost purely discretionary basis.13 Chief Justice Rehnquist
highlighted, in Mississippi v. Louisiana,14 the progression of the
Court's model.15 Originally, the Court used "discretion not to accept
original actions in cases within [its] nonexclusive original jurisdiction,
such as actions by States against citizens of other States and actions
between the United States and a State. [The Court has] since carried
over its exercise to actions between two States, where [its] jurisdiction
is exclusive. 1 6 Though state vs. state jurisdiction is statutorily commit-
ted to the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, the
litigants must still pass a two part test in order to be granted leave to
file on the Court's original docket. 17  However, "[w]hatever the
Court's intention to limit the scope and exercise of its original juris-
diction, under a theory of strict construction it cannot refuse to enter-
13 See Vincent L. McKusick, Discretionary Gatekeeping: The Supreme Court's Manage-
ment of Its Oiginal Jurisdiction Docket Since 1961, 45 ME. L. REV. 185, 202 (1993) ("The
substantial set of gatekeeping rules that the Supreme Court has developed adds up to
making its original jurisdiction for practical purposes almost as discretionary as its
certiorari jurisdiction over appellate cases, even for suits between states that.., fall
within the congressional definition of exclusive Supreme Court jurisdiction.").
14 506 U.S. 73 (1992).
15 This represents a change from the Court's early understanding that its original
jurisdiction was exclusive. See, e.g., Osborn v. Bank of the U.S., 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.)
738, 821 (1824) ('The constitution establishes the Supreme Court, and defines its
jurisdiction. It enumerates cases in which its jurisdiction is original and exclusive
16 Mississippi, 506 U.S. at 77 (citations omitted).
17 See id. "Determining whether a case is 'appropriate' for [the Supreme Court's]
original jurisdiction involves an examination of two factors. First, [the Court will]
look to 'the nature of the interest of the complaining State,'" id. (quoting Massachu-
setts v. Missouri, 308 U.S. 1, 18 (1939)), "focusing on the 'seriousness and dignity of
the claim."' Id. (quoting Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 93 (1972)). "'The
model case for invocation of th [e] Court's original jurisdiction is a dispute between
States of such seriousness that it would amount to casus belli if the States were fully
sovereign."' Id. (quoting Texas v. New Mexico, 462 U.S. 554, 571, n.18 (1983)). "Sec-
ond, [the Court will] explore the availability of an alternative forum in which the
issue tendered can be resolved." Id. (quoting City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. at 93). "In
Arizona v. New Mexico, for example, [the Court] declined to exercise original jurisdic-
tion of an action by Arizona against New Mexico challenging a New Mexico electricity
tax because of a pending state-court action by three Arizona utilities challenging the
same tax: '[W]e are persuaded that the pending state-court action provides an appro-
priate forum in which the issues tendered here may be litigated.'" Id. (quoting Ari-
zona v. New Mexico, 425 U.S. 794, 797 (1976)).
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tain cases falling within its original jurisdiction if no other forum is
available."1 8
One thing left open to the Supreme Court was the question of
intervention by nonstate parties in these original jurisdiction cases.
Intervention is "the procedural device whereby a stranger can present
a claim or defense in a pending action or in a proceeding incidental
thereto, and become a party for the purpose of the claim or defense
presented."19 While it is apparent that the founders did not envision
citizens being able to haul states into federal court,20 they were silent
as to those citizens presenting claims or defenses in matters that were
already before the Court. Given the common-law pleading regime
persistent at the time of the founding and code-pleading afterward,
this is not surprising. 21 It is only with the rise of the transactional
model and its more liberal ideas of intervention and case manage-
ment that these types of questions arise.22 Once facts became the unit
of dispute, rather than legal entitlements, intervention became a sta-
ple of the modern suit23 and the Court has struggled since with how to
employ it.24
The first instance of a nonstate party intervening as a plaintiff
seems to have taken place in 1922, in Oklahoma v. Texas. 25 The occa-
sion for it happening in that case seems to be unique26 and, since that
18 Anne-Marie C. Carstens, Lurking in the Shadows ofJudicial Process: Special Masters
in the Supreme Court's Original Jurisdiction Cases, 86 MINN. L. REV. 625, 640 (2002).
19 James Wm. Moore & Edward H. Levi, Federal Intervention I. The Right to Intervene
and Reorganization, 45 YALE L.J. 565, 565 (1936).
20 See Clark, supra note 12, at 1913 ("The Court considered the supposition that
the framers and ratifiers of the Amendment had left citizens free to sue their own
states to be 'almost an absurdity on its face.'" (quoting Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1,
15 (1890))).
21 See Moore & Levi, supra note 19, at 566 ("The modern theory on joinder of
parties has little in common with the restrictive and rigid common-law rules designed
for simple litigation in an era when formalism was the vogue.").
22 See generally Anthony J. Bellia Jr., Article III and the Cause of Action, 89 IOWA L.
REV. 777 (2004) (highlighting differences between historical actions at law and trans-
actional or rights-based understandings).
23 See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARv. L. REv.
1281, 1290 (1976) ("The proponents of 'efficiency' argued for a more informal and
flexible approach, to the end that the courts should not have to rehear the same
complex of events. This argument ultimately shifted the focus of the lawsuit from
legal theory to factual context-the 'transaction or occurrence' from which the action
arose. This in turn made it easier to view the set of events in dispute as giving rise to a
range of legal consequences all of which ought to be considered together." (footnote
omitted)).
24 See id.
25 258 U.S. 574 (1922).
26 See infra Part I.
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time, similar interventions against states have occurred infrequently
and not without questions as to their propriety. 27 The question
recently resurfaced in two cases on the Supreme Court's original juris-
diction docket during the October 2009 Term.28 In both instances,
the Court held, over vigorous dissents by the Chief Justice, that non-
state parties would be allowed to intervene in a suit against a state. 29
The question, therefore, arises: were these decisions correct, and what
should the Court's position be moving forward?
Part I of this Note will discuss the relevant history of nonstate
party involvement in original actions in the Supreme Court. While
Justice Alito traces the phenomenon itself back to the 1700s,30 the
more difficult question of intervention as plaintiffs, and the form
under which the Court currently deals with the issue, is relatively
new.31 An overview of these previous cases will help to shed light on
the current state of the Court's jurisprudence in this area. Part II will
examine the most recent cases in order to discern, if possible, a consis-
tent position regarding that jurisprudence. The Alabama and South
Carolina opinions, while both allowing nonstate intervention, contain
potentially conflicting criteria for the action. While South Carolina
allows for nonstate intervention when a party has a "unique ... inter-
est,"32 Alabama held that sovereign immunity did not bar such inter-
vention as long as the "same claims" 33 are asserted. This difference
should be recognized and addressed before the Court continues to
entertain such motions from nonstate parties. Part III will take a par-
ticular look at Chief Justice Robert's argument against such interven-
tion in Alabama. While his South Carolina argument based merely on
sovereignty concerns garnered four votes, 34 the seemingly stronger
argument, with which only Justice Thomas agreed, is the one articu-
27 See, e.g., Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605 (1983) (allowing certain Indian
tribes, arguably because of the United States' role in the suit and because tribes are
quasi-sovereign entities, to intervene as plaintiffs against California); Maryland v. Lou-
isiana, 451 U.S. 725 (1981) (allowing private companies, arguably without due dili-
gence to the Eleventh Amendment, to intervene as plaintiffs).
28 South Carolina v. North Carolina, 130 S. Ct. 854 (2010); Alabama v. North
Carolina, 130 S. Ct. 2295 (2010).
29 South Carolina, 130 S. Ct. at 859; Alabama, 130 S. Ct. at 2314-15.
30 See South Carolina, 130 S. Ct. at 861.
31 See id. at 862 ("This court likewise has granted leave, under appropriate cir-
cumstances, for nonstate entities to intervene as parties in original actions between
States for nearly 90 years.").
32 Id. at 866 (emphasis added).
33 Alabama, 130 S. Ct. at 2314 (emphasis added).
34 South Carolina, 130 S. Ct. at 869-70 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
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lated in Alabama based on the Eleventh Amendment. 35 Because South
Carolina involved defendant intervenors, the state immunity argument
did not surface in the Chief Justice's dissent there. The analysis in
Alabama is different. Due to both Eleventh Amendment and Federal-
ism concerns, Part V ultimately concludes that, while nonstate defen-
dant intervenors in original jurisdiction actions are within the scope
of Article III, the Court stepped outside of constitutional bounds by
allowing nonstate parties to intervene as plaintiffs. Since this directly
resulted from attempting to reconcile the sensible standard of inter-
vention outlined in South Carolina with the inexplicably expanded
standard in Alabama,36 a return to the South Carolina standard can
both bring consistency to original action jurisprudence as well as
avoid the Eleventh Amendment pitfall present in Alabama.
I. FROM PLAINTIFFS TO ONLY DEFENDANTS TO PLAINTIFFS AGAIN-
THE HISTORY OF NONSTATE INVOLVEMENT IN SUPREME
COURT ORIGINAL JURISDICTION CASES
The Constitution clearly allows for two types of suits in which
states are quite frequently involved: those between two or more states
and those between states and citizens. 37 And when the parts of Article
III, section two are taken together, it is also clear that these types of
suits fall within the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.3 8
Beyond that, the Court has traditionally made room on its original
35 See Alabama, 130 S. Ct. at 2317-19 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part).
36 See infra Part II.C.
37 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 ("The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law
and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Trea-
ties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority; to all Cases affecting
Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls; to all Cases of admiralty and mari-
time Jurisdiction; to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party; to Con-
troversies between two or more States, between a State and Citizens of another State, between
Citizens of different States; between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under
Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign
States, Citizens or Subjects.") (emphasis added).
38 This interpretation of the second sentence of section two makes the most tex-
tual sense and has been so read by the Supreme Court. "The second sentence of
Article III, §2 merely distributes the jurisdiction conferred in the first sentence
between the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction and its appellate jurisdiction; it
does not itself confer jurisdiction." GREssMAN ET AL., supra note 5, at 610; see also
Pennsylvania v. Quicksilver Mining Co., 77 U.S. 553, 556 (1871) ("This second clause
distributes the jurisdiction conferred upon the Supreme Court in the previous one
into original and appellate jurisdiction; but does not profess to confer any.").
2011] 2225
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docket for cases that combine these components3 9 and cases that are
only partially formed by the presence of these components. 40
A. Original Jurisdiction Cases Prior to 1922-The Beginnings of Nonstate
Party Involvement
It did not take long for a nonstate party to appear before the
Supreme Court in an original jurisdiction action. One of the first
occurrences was in 1792 "[in Georgia v. Brailsford,41 the fourth case
entered upon 'the original docket' of the Supreme Court."42 While
the Justices were divided as to the outcome, none of them had a juris-
dictional problem with the state of Georgia suing two citizens of South
Carolina. 43 This was not uncommon, and while these types of cases
are not exclusive to the original jurisdiction of the Court, it was and
still is appropriate for the Court to hear them.44 Somewhat ironically,
Chisholm v. Georgia,45 the case immediately in front of Brailsford on the
original docket,46 turned the tables by allowing a citizen of South Car-
olina to sue Georgia. 47 The uproar over the outcome famously
sparked an Amendment to the Constitution.48 But prior to the pas-
sage of the Eleventh Amendment, this type of interaction by a non-
state party was clearly acceptable. Therefore, while an argument exists
that nonstate parties should not be allowed to sue in original actions
of the Supreme Court,49 it is undisputed that the Constitution allows
for them to be sued in such cases; that was never in doubt.
Once nonstate parties were involved in suits with states, they
began to also take part in suits between states. Just a few years after
39 See infra Part I.A.
40 See infra Part I.B-D.
41 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 402 (1792).
42 HANNIS TAYLOR, JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES 51 (1905).
43 See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dali.) 419, 473 (1793) (opinion ofJay, C.J.).
44 See U.S. CONST. art. III; 28 U.S.C. § 1251 (2006).
45 2 U.S. (2 Dal].) 419 (1793) superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST.
amend. XI.
46 See TAYLOR, supra note 42, at 70.
47 See Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) at 479 (opinion of Jay, C.J.) ("[A] State is suable
by citizens of another State.").
48 See Clark, supra note 12, at 1886-87 ("The reaction to Chisholm was swift and
almost uniformly hostile. The anger seemed to be directed as much against Federal-
ists ... as against the Supreme Court itself.... [H]owever, ... Federalists were equally
disappointed with the Court's decision .. . (and] joined Antifederalists in supporting
a constitutional amendment to restore their preferred construction.").
49 See infra Part III.
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Chisholm, the Court heard New York v. Connecticut 5O-the first original
jurisdiction case between two states. 51 This case serves as a precursor
to the modern state of jurisprudence in this area by virtue of the non-
state parties also involved. The full name of the case was "The State of
New York v. The State of Connecticut et al.," and it involved plaintiffs
from a prior civil suit concerning land being made defendants in the
action between states over a border dispute. 52 Though the 'et al.' in
the case were not intervenors, they still represented nonstate party
involvement in an original jurisdiction action. Similarly, in Missouri v.
Illinois,5 3 also known as the "State of Missouri v. State of Illinois and
Sanitary District of Chicago," there was, again, involuntary nonstate party
involvement in an original jurisdiction action-the Sanitary District
was made a defendant by Missouri. 54 These cases are indicative of
original jurisdiction jurisprudence through the first part of the twenti-
eth century. Reading the two parts of Article III, section two together,
both of these cases show an expansion of thought from a strict formu-
lation of Article III.55 This combination of state and nonstate parties
in suits posed no constitutional problem, though, as it was merely a
synthesis of two jurisdictionable 5 6 classes: suits by states against other
states and suits by states against other states' citizens.
B. Oklahoma v. Texas57 -A Shift in Nonstate Party Jurisdiction
Prior to 1922, nonstate involvement in original jurisdiction cases
was limited (at least after Chisholm) to instances where those parties
were the ones being sued; that changed in Oklahoma v. Texas. After an
initial suit was commenced between the two states, the United States
intervened, using its authority under United States v. Texas,58 to bring
suit against both states in order to resolve a boundary dispute. 59 This
50 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 1 (1799).
51 See Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 224 (1901) ("The case of New York v.
Connecticut, in 1799, was the first instance of an exercise by the Supreme Court of its
jurisdiction in a controversy between two states." (citation omitted)).
52 See New York, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) at 1. This case arose after the Supreme Court
denied the requests of the nonstate parties to represent their states (New York and
Connecticut) in an original jurisdiction action. See Fowler v. Lindsey, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.)
411, 413-15 (1799).
53 180 U.S. 208 (1901).
54 See id. at 208-09.
55 See supra note 38.
56 Either a case or a category of parties over which a court can exercise
jurisdiction.
57 258 U.S. 574 (1922).
58 See supra note 7.
59 See Oklahoma, 258 U.S. at 578-79.
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new, enlarged suit was not a problem as it could simply be viewed as
another amalgamation ofjurisdictionable classes into one case. How-
ever, in the meantime, the United States had taken possession of the
land being contested.60 Nonstate party intervenors were then allowed
to join the action because of the unique nature of the receivership
relationship 61 and, in a form of "ancillary" jurisdiction to the initial
suit, permitted to prosecute claims.62
The case thus presented, for the first time, nonstate intervenors
in an original jurisdiction suit as plaintiffs in a state-versus-state scena-
rio.63 Why was this not a violation of the Eleventh Amendment?64
The Court noted that, because the United States placed the disputed
land into a receiver's possession, a unique situation was created that
allowed ancillary jurisdiction where "independent suits to enforce the
claims could not [normally] be entertained."65 It should also be
noted that the intervenors' claims, whether ancillary or not, were
effectively made against the United States 66-which had presumably
waived immunity due to taking on the receivership-rather than the
states themselves. Though the land belonged to the states, it also
belonged to the United States, and it was the federal sovereign who
took possession of the land and opened the door to the nonstate
intervenors. 67 Thus, the situation may not have been a carte blanche
60 See id. at 580.
61 See id. at 581 ("[N] umerous parties... intervened for the purpose of asserting
rights to particular tracts [of land] in the [United States'] possession .... " (emphasis
added)).
62 See id. ("The other claims ... are brought before us because no other court
lawfully can interfere with or disturb [the receiver's] possession or control. It long
has been settled that claims to property or funds of which a court has taken possession
and control through a receiver or like officer may be dealt with as ancillary to the suit
63 See South Carolina v. North Carolina, 130 S. Ct. 854, 862 (2010) (referencing
the intervention in Oklahoma).
64 See Chayes, supra note 23, at 1290 ("The question of the right to intervene is
inevitably linked to the question of standing to initiate litigation in the first place.").
If the nonstate party has no standing to initiate in the first place due to the Eleventh
Amendment, intervention should also be barred because of the concomitant exten-
sion of the judicial power of the United States to a suit prosecuted by a citizen against
a state.
65 Oklahoma, 258 U.S. at 581. It seems to still be a type of supplemental jurisdic-
tion that the Court invokes to bring nonstate parties into original jurisdiction action.
See infra Part III.
66 See Oklahoma, 258 U.S. at 581 (stating that the land in question was "in the
[United States'] possession").
67 The presence of property in the hands of the court (or, in this case, the sover-
eign represented by the Supreme Court) traditionally played a determinative role in
2228 [VOL. 86:5
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for intervenors to prosecute suits against states. The Court would
later seize upon this decision, however, to enlarge nonstate parties'
rights to do exactly that.68
C. Maryland v. Louisiana 69 -The Transformation of Nonstate Parties to
Full Plaintiff Status
Building off of the potential misunderstanding from Oklahoma,
the Supreme Court allowed several private parties to intervene in an
original action against a state in Maryland v. Louisiana. This time,
although the United States was again an intervenor, there was no unu-
sual insertion by the federal government (i.e., acting as receiver in
Oklahoma v. Texas). Nevertheless, "noting that it is not unusual to per-
mit intervention of private parties in original actions,"70 the Court
allowed "several States, joined by the United States and a number of
pipeline companies, [to] challenge the constitutionality of Louisiana's
'First-Use Tax' imposed on certain uses of natural gas." 71
The distinguishing characteristic of the decision was its focus on
the propriety of the states' involvement in the original action while
literally ignoring the presence of a nonstate entity suing in seeming
violation of the Eleventh Amendment.72 The Amendment is only
mentioned, admittedly "in passing," in one footnote that fails to even
address the real question.73 The Court argued that its "original juris-
diction [was] not affected by the provisions of the Eleventh Amend-
ment" because "an original action between two States only violates the
Eleventh Amendment if the plaintiff State is actually suing to recover
whether a court would allow intervention, and the overtones of that can be seen here.
See Moore & Levi, supra note 19, at 572-73.
68 Almost the exact scenario arose in 1976 when the City of Port Arthur, Texas
was allowed to intervene in a suit where Louisiana was the defendant. See Texas v.
Louisiana, 426 U.S. 465 (1976). The case was similar in that the United States had
first intervened, and then the city "was permitted to [also] intervene for purposes of
protecting its interests in the . . . claims of the United States." Id. at 466 (emphasis
added).
69 451 U.S. 725 (1981).
70 Id. at 745 n.21 (referencing Oklahoma v. Texas approvingly).
71 Id. at 728.
72 See id. at 735 (arguing for general original jurisdiction in cases between states);
see also id. at 737 ("Jurisdiction is also supported by the States' interest as parens
patriae."); id. at 739-44 (arguing further for the suitability, with respect to providing
original jurisdiction over the state claim, of allowing the suit because of the inappro-
priateness of any other forum). The fighting in Maiyland was about whether the state
claim could be heard in an original action because of the actual interests being repre-
sented. The arguments never addressed the correctness of admitting the intervenors.
73 Id. at 745 n.21.
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for injuries to specific individuals."74 The Court, by focusing only on
the effect the Eleventh Amendment would have on the state's suit,
completely ignored the potential Eleventh Amendment violation com-
ing from the nonstate's suit-the very thing the Amendment addressed
in the first place.
D. Arizona v. California 75 -Solid ifying the Transformation of Nonstate
Parties to Full Plaintiff Status
As a cornerstone of the recent cases in this area, 76 it is crucial to
highlight the Court's reasoning regarding nonstate intervenors to
original jurisdiction cases in Arizona v. California. There, Arizona filed
suit against California over water rights, Nevada intervened, and Utah
and New Mexico were subsequently joined as defendants. 77 The
United States then intervened (reminiscent of Oklahoma v. Texas) "on
behalf of various federal establishments, including the reservations of
five Indian Tribes."7 8 "Because the United States . . . represented
their interests, the Indian Tribes [initially] . . .had no part in the
litigation," but later "moved for leave to intervene as indispensable
parties. ' 79 The Court agreed that their motions should be granted. 0
The Court began by assuming arguendo that a state could use the
Eleventh Amendment to bar a suit brought by an Indian tribe. 81 The
next move was to tie the intervenors' claims to those of the United
States.8 2 In keeping with the Oklahoma/Maryland line of thought, the
Court then simply assumed that the "piggybacking" of claims onto the
74 Id. (emphasis added).
75 460 U.S. 605 (1983).
76 Justice Scalia highlights Arizona as the case that would need to be overturned
in order to accept the Chief Justice's argument in Alabama. See infra notes 183-89
and accompanying text.
77 See Arizona, 460 U.S. at 608.
78 Id. at 608-09.
79 Id. at 612.
80 See id. at 613.
81 See id. at 614. This contention, however, is far from certain-especially consid-
ering the quasi-sovereign nature of Indian Tribes that somewhat parallels state sover-
eignty. The decision to allow intervention may thus have been right for the wrong
reason. This question will be dealt with further in Part III with a look at the implica-
tions of Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1995).
82 See Arizona, 460 U.S. at 614 ("Nothing in the Eleventh Amendment 'has ever
been seriously supposed to prevent a State's being sued by the United States.' The
Tribes do not seek to bring new claims or issues against the States, but only ask leave
to participate in an adjudication . . .commenced by the United States." (citations
omitted) (quoting United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128, 140 (1965))).
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existing suit did not violate the Eleventh Amendment.8 3 By utilizing
Oklahoma (where the immunity question was unnecessary)8 4 and
Maryland (where the immunity question was overlooked),85 the Court
was able to again allow intervention without actually answering the
Eleventh Amendment question. Instead, the Court's efforts go toward
establishing that the Indian Tribes count just like everyone else8 6
when it comes to piling-on to existing suits. 87 Though the justification
was obviously not beyond reproach, it paved the way for the recent
decisions to which we now turn.
II. JUSTIFYING INTERVENTION AND RECONCILING JURISPRUDENCE-THE
CURRENT MODEL FOR NONSTATE INVOLVEMENT IN SUPREME
COURT ORIGINAL JURISDICTION CASES
It is in view of this patchwork of assumptions and judicial hand-
waving that the Supreme Court recently considered again the ques-
tion of allowing nonstate intervenors in original jurisdiction actions.
In a 5-4 decision in South Carolina v. North Carolina,88 the Court
upheld the decision of the Special Master in the case and granted
motions for nonstate parties to intervene as defendants.8 9 The rea-
soning behind granting the motions, however, could be seen to con-
flict with the reasoning allowing nonstate intervention in Alabama v.
83 See id. ("[O]urjudicial power over the controversy is not enlarged by granting
leave to intervene, and the States' sovereign immunity protected by the Eleventh
Amendment is not compromised.").
84 See supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
85 See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
86 See Arizona, 460 U.S. at 615 ("Moreover, the Indians are entitled 'to take their
place as independent qualified members of the modern body politic.'" (quoting
Poafpybitty v. Skelly Oil Co., 390 U.S. 365, 369 (1968))). By focusing exclusively on
ensuring that Tribes "count," it seems the Court failed to consider that they should
count differently. The argument assumed at the beginning to be a given-that states
are immune from suit against Indian Tribes-began to break down as Indian sover-
eignty started to subtly work its way into the reasoning behind allowing intervention.
See infra notes 188 and 194 and accompanying text (arguing that recognizing the
sovereignty of Indian Tribes is the correct thing to do and that the Arizona decision
should, thus, not pose an Eleventh Amendment problem).
87 A definite bias in allowing intervention exists owing to an underlying sense of
fairness that people/groups should be allowed to participate when their rights are at
stake-even if those rights are already being represented by another party. See Moore
& Levi, supra note 19, at 573 ("Modern intervention practice, as will be seen, is an
expansion of what seems to have always been the underlying principle in the develop-
ment of intervention: the purpose of the courts to prevent their processes from being
used to the prejudice of the rights of interested third persons.").
88 130 S. Ct. 854 (2010).
89 Id. at 868.
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North Carolina.90 The two opinions, six months apart, seem to provide
mutually exclusive justifications for when the Court will allow nonstate
intervenors in original jurisdiction actions. This portion of the Note
will examine the two opinions, with respect to intervention standards,
and attempt to develop a sound and consistent view of nonstate inter-
vention moving forward.
A. Thesis-South Carolina v. North Carolina, Allowing Nonstate
Intervention as Defendants
As is true with many suits between states, South Carolina v. North
Carolina was about water rights. 9 1 South Carolina complained that
North Carolina was exceeding its equitable use of the Catawba River.
92
Two private entities named in the original complaint were granted
leave to intervene-the Catawba River Water Supply Project
(CRWSP), a bi-state entity jointly owned by North Carolina's Union
County and South Carolina's Lancaster County, and Duke Energy, a
license holder entitled to use the river to generate power.93 Given the
history of nonstate involvement discussed previously, the Court held
that it was "not a novel proposition to accord party status to a citizen
in an original action between States."9 4 However, since "a compelling
reason for allowing citizens to participate in one original action is not
necessarily a compelling reason for allowing citizens to intervene in all
original actions," the Court attempted to establish a workable set of
criteria for when such intervention is appropriate. 95
The Court relied on New Jersey v. New York96 in laying down the
appropriate standard for intervention of nonstate parties. 97 When an
entity, whose state is already a party, moves to intervene in an original
jurisdiction action, the intervenor has "the burden of showing some
compelling interest in his own right, apart from his interest in a class
90 See Part II.B infra. The Alabama decision is fundamentally different because of
the plaintiff status of the party there but, nevertheless, contributes to the language of
the intervention standard being developed by the Court.
91 Boundary disputes are the most common, by far. See TAYLOR, supra note 42, at
57.
92 See South Carolina, 130 S. Ct. at 859.
93 See id. at 860.
94 Id. at 862.
95 Id.
96 345 U.S. 369 (1953).
97 See South Carolina, 130 S. Ct. at 862. The New Jersey Court held that the City of
Philadelphia could not intervene because of Pennsylvania's parens patriae role in the
suit providing adequate representation in a matter of sovereign interest. See New
Jersey, 345 U.S. at 372-73.
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with all other citizens and creatures of the state, which interest is not
properly represented by the state."98 Even though the majority in
South Carolina acknowledged the "high threshold to intervention by
nonstate parties in a sovereign dispute committed to [the] Court's
original jurisdiction,"99 it utilized the New Jersey standard to "conclude
that the CRWSP . . .demonstrated a sufficiently compelling interest
that [was] unlike the interests of other citizens of the States."'100 Duke
Energy was also held to have a "unique and compelling interest" to
intervene in the suit' I while the City of Charlotte was denied even
permissive intervention, which can be granted "when a movant
presents a sufficiently 'important but ancillary concern."102
The dissent in South Carolina relied on two prudential concerns
for justifying a withholding of jurisdiction: (1) the suit was an equita-
ble apportionment action and, as such, merited withholding of the
original jurisdiction suited for "weighty controversies involving the
States,"' 0 3 and (2) the Supreme Court is "not well suited to assume the
role of a trial judge."'1 4 However, the dissent's arguments against
intervention can be answered by the Court's previous involvement in
equitable apportionment suits with nonstate intervenors10 5 and its
long history of using Special Masters to ease the burden of trial-type
duties. 10 6 Because the intervenors are on the side of the defense, the
possible problem here would be a diversity issue due to the fact that
the CRWSP was a citizen of both states.
"In interpreting its original jurisdiction, the Supreme Court has
adopted something akin to the 'complete diversity rule' governing the
scope of diversity jurisdiction between private parties under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332, rejecting notions of supplemental jurisdiction." v0 7  The
import of this is that, because South Carolina would be suing citizens
of its state, the complete diversity would break down'08 and either the
CRWSP would not be allowed to intervene or, if the case could not
98 New Jersey, 345 U.S. at 373.
99 South Carolina, 130 S. Ct. at 863.
100 Id. at 864.
101 Id. at 866.
102 Id. at 868 n.8 (quoting Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 616 (1983)).
103 Id. at 869 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
104 Id.
105 See, e.g., Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605 (1983).
106 See generally Carstens, supra note 18 (acknowledging the vital role played by
Special Masters and arguing for reform measures given their important place in origi-
nal jurisdiction cases).
107 icHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE FEDERAL SYsTEM 258 (6th ed. 2009).
108 See Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).
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proceed without them, the suit would be dismissed. 10 9 And so while
28 U.S.C. § 1251 did not forbid intervention, it could be that Supreme
Court precedent did. However, the Calfornia v. Southern Pacific Co. 110
decision' need not hamstring the Court from deciding such cases
(and, indeed, it did not). The complete diversity rule is applicable to
§ 1332 cases, not to original jurisdiction actions under Article III and
§ 1251.112 If an intervenor is not prosecuting a suit against a state,
and if that intervenor meets the criteria for intervention laid out by
the Court, the citizenship should be of little concern. Though a com-
plicated question, many have argued that the primary reason for
diversityjurisdiction is avoiding the prejudices of alien jurisdictions.13
But if diversity jurisdiction is about avoiding "home-field advantage"
in meaningful suits amongst citizens, that concern is a nullity in this
case."14 Here, the suit is already in federal court and it is the state
suing; traditional diversity concerns are not present.
109 See FALLON ET AL., supra note 107, at 258 ("[I]n California v. Southern Pac.
Co., 157 U.S. 229 (1895), after California sued a citizen of another state, the Court
determined that the rights of other parties, citizens of California, were so bound up in
the action that the litigation should not proceed in their absence. In turn, the Court
denied jurisdiction: although there would have been original jurisdiction in an action
by California against the non-citizen defendant alone, the inclusion as defendants of
California citizens, who could not have been sued independently in the Supreme
Court, was fatal to the jurisdiction.").
110 157 U.S. 229 (1895).
111 See id. at 261 (reflecting a former sentiment that the Supreme Court's original
jurisdiction "is limited and manifestly intended to be sparingly exercised").
112 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2006) ("The district courts shall have original jurisdic-
tion .... " (emphasis added)).
113 See, e.g., Diane P. Wood, The Changing Face of Diversity Jurisdiction, 82 TEMP. L.
REV. 593, 594 (2009) ("Madison mentioned the latter purpose, which is still accepted
today, when he speculated that there might be prejudice in some states against the
citizens of others who had claims against the in-state parties.").
114 See Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The Class Action Fairness Act in Perspective: The Old and
the New in Federal Jurisdictional Reform, 156 U. PA. L. REv. 1823, 1833 (2008) ("The
historical record gave sparse indication why the framers and ratifiers adopted [diver-
sity] jurisdiction, and the scattered bits of evidence suggested only that they intended
it to provide protection against some kind of bias or unfairness, real or anticipated,
that non-residents might encounter in the states."). But see Stephen B. Burbank, The
Bitter with the Sweet: Tradition, History, and Limitations on Federal Judicial Power-A Case
Study, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1291, 1323 (2000) ("An important reason for the exis-
tence of Article III federal judicial power in diversity (including alienage diversity)
cases and for the First Congress's decision to create lower federal courts had to do
with concerns that state courts were hostile to creditors."). Ultimately, the original
reasoning in providing diversity jurisdiction is inconsequential to the point here that
it is unnecessary to divest the Court of original jurisdiction because of a native-citi-
zen's involvement.
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South Carolina illustrates that intervention as a defendant by a
nonstate party is not an issue. The vital take-away from the case is its
formulation of the nonstate intervention standard: "[A] proposed
intervenor [must] show a compelling interest 'in his own right,' dis-
tinct from the collective interest of 'all other citizens and creatures of
the state,' whose interest the State presumptively represents in matters
of sovereign policy."11 5 It is this formulation which will be compared
to the Alabama standard set forth in the next section.
B. Antithesis-Alabama v. North Carolina, Allowing Nonstate
Intervention as Plaintiffs
Before delving into the Alabama decision, it is helpful to distin-
guish between the two logical pieces of the puzzle that the Court must
deal with in deciding whether to grant a nonstate entity's motion to
intervene.11 6 First, the Court must ensure that the basic standards for
intervention are met. To put it differently, are the intervention
requirements of Article III, § 1251, and the Supreme Court's prece-
dent all satisfied? Second, it should fall to the Court-and indeed
Part III will argue that it did fall to the Court-to justify jurisdiction
beyond just the basic standards for intervention. In other words, do
constitutional provisions external to Article III, such as the Eleventh
Amendment, prevent an otherwise proper intervenor from doing so?
This portion of the Note only deals with the first question and ana-
lyzes the standard for intervention laid down in Alabama to acknowl-
edge the internal difficulties of the current model.
11 7
In 1986, Congress gave consent under the Compact Clause for
the Southeast Interstate Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management
Compact (Compact) to be formed: Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Missis-
sippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia were
115 South Carolina v. North Carolina, 130 S. Ct. 854, 867 (2010) (quoting New
York v. New Jersey, 345 U.S. 369, 373 (1953)).
116 See Edward H. Levi & James Win. Moore, Federal Intervention: II. The Procedure,
Status, and Federal Jurisdictional Requirements, 47 YALE L.J. 898, 902 (1938) ("The nature
of his right to intervene is of course only one problem facing the intervener. The
additional problems concerning the intervener in the federal courts may be classified
roughly as dealing with (1) the procedure for intervention; (2) the status of the inter-
vener; and (3) the federal jurisdictional requirements in their relation to interven-
tion. These problems are only partially solved by the proposed rules of civil
procedure, which are somewhat specific as to the procedure for intervention, but
which do not cover, save possibly by implication, the status of the intervener or the
problem of jurisdictional requirements.").
117 The second question is addressed in Part III, infra, with a look at the Eleventh
Amendment restraint on intervention.
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its members. 118 North Carolina was selected as a host state but con-
tributed to the break up of the Compact when it was unable to follow
through with its responsibilities.1 19 The Compact, not a sovereign
entity, 12° attempted to bring an original action against North Carolina
in 2000 but was denied because of the language of§ 1251.121 In 2002,
Alabama, Florida, Tennessee, and Virginia were joined by the Com-
pact Commission in a suit against North Carolina. 122
In deciding to allow the Compact's motion to intervene, the
Court relied heavily on Arizona v. Califormia123 and used language
from that decision in forming its standard for the intervention.1 24
The Special Master's position, accepted by the Court, was that "sover-
eign immunity does not bar the Commission's suit, so long as the
Commission asserts the same claims and seeks the same relief as the
other plaintiffs."125 And so while the Commission could not bring its
claims in a stand-alone action under the Supreme Court's original
jurisdiction, the Court held that the Compact could "assert them...
alongside the plaintiff States,"126 so long as the "nonsovereign plain-
tiff[ ] bring[s] an entirely overlapping claim for relief that burdens
the State with no additional defense or liability."12 7
118 See Alabama v. North Carolina, 130 S. Ct. 2295, 2302-03 (2010).
119 See id. at 2303-05.
120 See id. at 2314 n.5 ("We have held that an entity created through a valid exer-
cise of the Interstate Compact Clause is not entitled to immunity from suit under the
Eleventh Amendment, see Hess v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corporation, 513 U.S. 30
(1994), but we have not decided whether such an entity's suit against a State is barred
by sovereign immunity." (citations omitted)); id. at 2317 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) ("The Commission is not a sovereign State.").
121 See Se. Interstate Low-Level Radioactive Waste Mgmt. Comm'n v. North Caro-
lina, 531 U.S. 942 (2000) (mem.). There, the Solicitor General successfully urged
"denial of the Commission's motion on the grounds that [it] did not fall within [the
Supreme Court's] exclusive original jurisdiction over 'controversies between two or
more States.'" Alabama, 130 S. Ct. at 2305 (majority opinion) (quoting 28 U.S.C.
§ 1251 (a)).
122 See Alabama, 130 S. Ct. at 2305.
123 See id. at 2314 ("The Special Master relied upon our decision in Arizona v.
California, which held that the Eleventh Amendment did not bar the participation of
several Indian Tribes in an original action . . . ." (citation omitted)).
124 See id. ("We granted the Tribes' motion, stating that the States do not enjoy
sovereign immunity against the United States, and '[t] he Tribes do not seek to bring
new claims or issues against the States' ... . Thus 'our judicial power over the contro-
versy is not enlarged by granting leave to intervene . . . .'" (alteration in original)
(quoting Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 614 (1983))).
125 Id. (emphasis added).
126 Id. at 2316.
127 Id. at 2315.
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Given the Commission's ability, according to the congressionally
approved Compact, to intervene on behalf of the states,1 28 it seems,
from a purely interventional standpoint, that the Court's decision was
acceptable. Even setting aside Eleventh Amendment issues, though,
there may be a problem with the standard set forth in Alabama for
allowing intervention of a nonstate party. If the claim must be identi-
cal to that of the state(s) in the suit, so as not to enlarge the contro-
versy,129 how does that mesh with South Carolina's requirement that
intervenors have a compelling interest in their own right that is not
adequately represented by the state?130 The requirement in Alabama
of not burdening the state with an additional defense 31 may be diffi-
cult to reconcile with establishing a unique "angle" in the case that a
nonstate party needs to intervene after South Carolina. It is to that task
that we will turn next.
C. Synthesis-Attempting to Reconcile South Carolina with Alabama
In cases where nonstate intervenors bring claims against a state,
the Court has normally viewed those claims as supplemental to the
suit between the states.13 2 Once the initial jurisdiction is established,
the Court has decided to answer claims brought within the totality of
that controversy between states rather than viewing the Article III/
§ 1251 language as constricting.1 33 After all, if a court has a legitimate
128 The Court in Alabama gives much credence to the fact that the Commission
was authorized to appear on behalf of states within the Compact as an intervenor or a
party in interest. See id. at 2315-16. However, as noted previously, this was not
enough to get the Compact originaljurisdiction on its own against North Carolina.
See supra notes 120-21 and accompanying text.
129 See Alabama, 130 S. Ct. at 2314.
130 See South Carolina v. North Carolina, 130 S. Ct. 854, 867 (2010).
131 See Alabama, 130 S. Ct. at 2315.
132 See supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text.
133 Although the Supreme Court is not implicated in 28 U.S.C. § 1367. it seems to
treat supplemental jurisdiction in its cases in a fashion similar to how the district
courts handle supplemental jurisdiction according to the statute. Subsection (a) of
§ 1367 reads: "Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) or as expressly provided
otherwise by Federal statute, in any civil action of which the district courts have origi-
nal jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims
that are so related to claims in the action within such oniginal jurisdiction that they form part of
the same case or controversy under Article Ill of the United States Constitution. Such sup-
plemental jurisdiction shall include claims that involve the joinder or intervention of
additional parties." 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2006) (emphasis added). The Supreme Court
has adopted this transactional model in managing its original docket.
A further indication of the Supreme Court's willingness to follow the conventions
of supplemental jurisdiction is its traditional adherence to the prohibition of
§ 1367(b) that forbids exercising supplemental jurisdiction when it is inconsistent
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complaint before it, the reasons diminish for why the court should not
resolve all of the related claims. In these instances, the question for
the Supreme Court becomes, "What are the limits to this supplemen-
tal original jurisdiction?" At present, the answer seems to be if a non-
state entity will not be adequately represented by the state, and its
claim is unique in some way, it may bring it in an original action but
only if it will not enlarge the controversy and burden the state with an
additional defense or liability. In other words, an entity must establish
the same claim but in a way that is not already represented.
Though this seems like a Catch-22 scenario, Trbovich v. United
Mine Workers of America134 might help to clarify the standard here.
Although it arises in a different context, Trbovich may be illuminating
by showing that these two standards do not have to be mutually exclu-
sive. The Court there held that although a union worker would
receive adequate representation in federal court by a government
attorney, the worker could still intervene. 135 After all, the Court rea-
soned, the same claim can be served by different interests, and such
interests "may not always dictate precisely the same approach to the
conduct of the litigation."'1 36 An example of this might be a politically
charged atmosphere (such as a union dispute) where the government
officials are unwilling, for political reasons, to make a certain argu-
ment that another party might be willing to make in support of the
exact same claim. This line of reasoning helps to reconcile the "differ-
ent claims but no enlargement of the controversy" standard, but the
additional language from Alabama still remains troublesome.
The Alabama Court seems to go too far when it says an intervenor
should not burden the State with any "additional defense or liabil-
ity."' 137 The liability portion is not difficult to justify since the state's
responsibility does not change with the addition of the nonstate party.
The any additional defense part, though, seems more difficult.138 If
the Trbovich line of reasoning is accepted, the additional interest that
necessitates a different litigation strategy will require a different argu-
with the requirements of § 1332 jurisdiction. See supra notes 107-09 and accompany-
ing text.
134 404 U.S. 528 (1972).
135 See id. at 539.
136 Id.
137 Alabama v. North Carolina, 130 S. Ct. 2295, 2315 (2010). The majority relies
on the existence of "entirely overlapping claims for relief between sovereign and non-
sovereign plaintiffs." Id. at 2315 n. 7 (emphasis added).
138 I am taking this usage of "defense" to be colloquial rather than formal. It
seems to refer merely to the act of arguing against a point the other side is raising
rather than a rigid formulation raised by the defendant.
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ment for the claim. By its nature, this additional argument will trigger
an additional defense and the Alabama standard will be violated.
However, if "no additional defense" means that the state is only made
to argue the same basic point, even though it may have to make that
same defense against an additional argument, perhaps Trbovich
resolves the apparent conflict. Far from ideal, the Court is left with
either an improperly expanded or an unnecessarily vague standard
for intervention that should be clarified or overruled.
III. DENYING INTERVENTION AND PRESERVING CONSTITUTIONALITY-
THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT BARRIER TO NONSTATE
INVOLVEMENT IN SUPREME COURT ORIGINAL
JURISDICTION CASES
Waiver and sovereign immunity are two of the common reasons
for an otherwise qualified plaintiff to be thrown out of court-exter-
nal restraints often block legitimate complaints. As noted in Part II.B,
the Supreme Court, in considering motions to intervene under its
original jurisdiction, must justify jurisdiction beyond the mere qualifi-
cations for intervention. It must also consider if there is a restraint
external to Article III that prevents an otherwise proper intervenor
from doing so. As Chief Justice Roberts argues in dissent in Alabama,
the Eleventh Amendment is such a restraint for nonstate parties seek-
ing to intervene as plaintiffs in original actions. 139 This Part of the
Note examines the arguments, both for and against permitting non-
state plaintiff intervenors, and ultimately concludes that the Chief Jus-
tice was correct in his assessment.
A. Alabama v. the Eleventh Amendment-Unpacking the Dissent
The dissent begins with a structural argument that is woven
throughout: States are sovereign entities and cannot be sued by non-
sovereign entities, even if the claims and relief asked for are the
same.1 40 It then compares the majority's proposition from Arizona
concerning a lack of enlargement of the controversy to the text of the
Eleventh Amendment. 14 I Finally, the Chief Justice references the his-
tory of the Constitution leaving the states' pre-existing immunity from
139 See Alabama, 130 S. Ct. at 2319 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) ("It is precisely the Commission's status as a party, its attempt to 'prosecut[e]'
a 'suit in law or equity... against one of the United States, that sovereign immunity
forbids." (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend.
XI)).
140 See id. at 2317.
141 See id. at 2317-18.
2011] 2239
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
private suits intact' 42 before concluding that it is "impossible for the
Court to hear private claims against a nonconsenting State without
expanding 'our judicial power over the controversy.'- 143 This section
traces the logic behind the arguments in the dissent progressing from
the history and text of the Amendment to the structural argument.
When the Constitution was drafted, the prevailing, though still
controversial, idea was that states were immune from suit in any area
in which immunity was not waived. 144 "Keeping the Founders'
assumptions in mind, they would not have understood the Constitu-
tion to provide any basis for individuals to sue states in federal court
after the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment."1 45 The Amendment
has, thus, been interpreted by the Court as follows: "The defect of
Chisholm was its failure to recognize absolute state sovereign immunity
from citizen suits in all circumstances, and this defect was corrected by
enshrining such immunity in the Constitution. No individual can sue
[a] state in federal court unless the defendant's constitutional immu-
nity is... waived or abrogated."146 Though there has been considera-
142 See id. at 2318. This argument is bolstered by the development of the Supreme
Court's sovereign immunity jurisprudence seen in Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 718
(1999). Though the Eleventh Amendment could be thought to apply only to § 1332
jurisdiction, the Court confirmed that § 1331 was also subject to state immunity
requirements even in state court. See Jay Tidmarsh, A Dialogic Defense of Alden, 75
NoTRE DAME L. REV. 1161, 1172 (2000) ("Seminole Tribe was a horrible blow to nation-
alists who view the essential function of lower federal courts to be the protection of
federal rights. Alden rubbed salt in the wound, for it removed even the backstop of
state courts (whose decision on federal law could have ultimately been reviewed by
the Supreme Court).").
143 Alabama, 130 S. Ct. at 2319 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (quoting Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 614 (1983)).
144 See THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 487 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) ("It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an
individual without its consent. This is the general sense, and the general practice of
mankind; and the exemption, as one of the attributes of sovereignty, is now enjoyed
by the government of every State in the Union. Unless, therefore, there is a surrender
of this immunity in the plan of the convention, it will remain with the States, and the
danger intimated must be merely ideal."); see also supra note 20 and accompanying
text (recognizing the traditional justification offered in Hans).
145 Clark, supra note 12, at 1912 (emphasis added).
146 Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1473 (1987).
Though Professor Amar disagrees with the interpretation, he acknowledges its pres-
ently understood meaning. See also H. Jefferson Powell & BenjaminJ. Priester, Conve-
nient Shorthand: The Supreme Court and the Language of State Sovereignty, 71 U. COLO. L.
REV. 645, 649 (2000) ("Contrary to the reasoning of the majority in Chisholm, the
Supreme Court has long viewed the states as possessing immunity from compulsory juris-
diction as part of their sovereign status.").
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ble debate on the topic, 147 this view has been the prevailing doctrine
since the decisions in Seminole Tribe and Alden. 148
In addition to understanding the historical interpretation of the
Amendment, it is also helpful to examine the text itself. The Eleventh
Amendment says: "The Judicial power of the United States shall not
be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another
State .... "149 The original jurisdiction suits in question would obvi-
ously seem to fall under the heading of "any suit." And though the
foundation of these suits is commencement by a state, 150 the prosecu-
tion of the suit is carried about by all parties involved in the contro-
versy.1 5 1 As the Chief Justice argues, "[t]here is no carve-out for suits
'prosecuted' by private parties so long as those parties 'do not seek to
bring new claims or issues.' "152 Once the Compact was allowed to
intervene, it is difficult to see how it was not then prosecuting a suit
against one of the United States in violation of the Constitution.
Since the Supreme Court has recognized that "sovereign immu-
nity provides an 'immunity from suit,' not a 'defense to ... liability,"'
it becomes inconsequential that the additional nonstate plaintiff in
Alabama was seeking the same relief and not imposing any additional
defense or liability burden on the state.153 The relief sought by a
plaintiff against a state rarely affects the authority of the Court to hear
147 See supra note 12.
148 See supra note 142.
149 U.S. CONST. amend. X1 (emphasis added).
150 Normally this is the case. Alabama is actually an exception where the Commis-
sion commenced the suit along with the states. See Alabama v. North Carolina, 130 S.
Ct. 2295, 2305 (2010).
151 Commencement and prosecution are two distinct phases of litigation, both of
which are prohibited by the Eleventh Amendment. SeeJohn V. Orth, History and the
Eleventh Amendment, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1147, 1148 (2000) ("There is at least one
reason, based in the Amendment's text itself, to wonder whether the drafter under-
stood the phrase in the sense claimed: the suits in question are carefully described as
those 'commenced or prosecuted' against a state. Either these words are redundant
or they draw a distinction between suits in two different stages of litigation. Jurisdic-
tion is disclaimed as to suits yet to be commenced, that is, begun; but jurisdiction is
also disclaimed as to suits previously commenced but not yet prosecuted to final reso-
lution. As to the latter, the judicial power had already attached: they too were to be
stopped by stripping the court of jurisdiction. Chief Justice John Marshall certainly
understood the distinction this way . . ").
152 Alabama, 130 S. Ct. at 2318 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (quoting Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 614 (1983)).
153 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. South Carolina Ports
Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 766 (2002)).
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a case. 154 Additionally, the plaintiff being prevented from receiving
any relief would not matter either.1 55 While the majority relies on
sovereign immunity being protected by the proposition that no new
claims equals no judicial enlargement, 156 that ultimately begs the
question. First, assuming there are no new claims or issues (even
though new issues are created by unique arguments),' 57 there is no
reason for the nonstate intervention-the interests are already ade-
quately represented. Second, an intervenor in a controversy, by defi-
nition, enlarges the judicial power of the Court because it now has
another party before it. Third, even if the judicial power is not viewed
as being enlarged, sovereign immunity is still violated because the
immunity is from suit, not from liability, and a nonstate party is being
allowed to prosecute the case against the state. 158 While "[tihe simi-
larity of claims may be relevant to joinder or intervention .... those
are procedural means of processing claims, not fonts of judicial
authority."159
B. Scalia v. the Eleventh Amendment-Dissecting the Majority Opinion
In a footnote in Alabama, Justice Scalia notes that, because North
Carolina did not ask the Court to overturn Arizona and because the
Court did not want to do so on its own motion without argument, they
would "not address the merits" of the dissent.1 60 In reality, though,
there are attempts by the majority to address the dissent's Eleventh
Amendment argument that should not be overlooked. First, the opin-
ion points out that the Compact may not take the exact same form as
a citizen and so could fall outside the prohibitions of the Eleventh
154 See, e.g., Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 58 (1996) ("[T]he relief sought
by a plaintiff suing a State is irrelevant to the question whether the suit is barred
.... "). Section 1983 actions where money will be paid from the state treasury are one
of the exceptions to the rule.
155 See Alabama, 130 S. Ct. at 2318 (Roberts, CJ., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) ("Indeed, we have suggested that private parties may not sue even if a court is
'precluded... from awarding them any relief.'" (alteration in original) (quoting Fed.
Mar. Comm'n, 535 U.S. at 766)).
156 See id. at 2314 (majority opinion) ("Thus, 'our judicial power over the contro-
versy is not enlarged by granting leave to intervene, and the States' sovereign immu-
nity protected by the Eleventh Amendment is not compromised."' (quoting Arizona,
460 U.S. at 614)).
157 See supra Part II.C.
158 See Alabama, 130 S. Ct. at 2319 (Roberts, CJ., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
159 Id.
160 Id. at 2315 n.6 (majority opinion).
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Amendment. 161 Second, the majority argues that the Amendment is
not compromised if the suit is not enlarged beyond what the state
parties are claiming. 162 Third, even in its "refusal" to answer the Chief
Justice, it answers him by referencing both precedent and the pruden-
tial concern of deciding an un-argued motion. 163 Moreover, addi-
tional arguments also require a response.
First of all, if the Compact cannot fairly be called a "citizen of the
United States," (and obviously not a "citizen of a foreign state") it
could possibly be thought of as a quasi-sovereign entity exempt from
Eleventh Amendment proscription. Though the Court has not tech-
nically decided this question, this argument seems to be the weakest
one, and there are multiple indicators that would seem to point
against the Commission's being allowed to bring suit against a state.
To begin with, the Compact Commission is not considered by the
Court to be sovereign.1 64 Since the immunity of states from suit actu-
ally extends beyond the text of the Eleventh Amendment by relying
on the sovereign/nonsovereign distinction, 65 this is a key determina-
tion. If the Commission, though federal, does not have sovereign
rights, it begins to look something like a corporation. 166 A corpora-
tion would be considered a citizen and obviously barred from suing
under the Amendment.
161 See id. at 2314 n.5 ("We have held that an entity created through a valid exer-
cise of the Interstate Compact Clause is not entitled to immunity from suit under the
Eleventh Amendment, but we have not decided whether such an entity's suit against a
State is barred by sovereign immunity." (citation omitted)).
162 See id. at 2314.
163 See id. at 2315 n.6.
164 See id. at 2314 n.5. If the Commission were a sovereign entity, it should be
entitled to immunity from suit.
165 See supra note 142.
166 Commissions are separate legal entities but their exact status is unclear. See
Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-240, 99
Stat. 1842, 1877 (1986) ("The Commission herein established is a legal entity separate
and distinct from the party states capable of acting in its own behalf and is liable for
its actions."). They seem to be a hybrid between federal agencies and corporations.
Compare Se. Interstate Low-Level Radioactive Waste Mgmt. Comm'n, By-LAws (2006),
at Art. IX, available at http://secompact.org/publications ("The seal of the Southeast
Interstate Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management Commission shall contain the
name of the Commission, which shall be used in such manner as seals generally are
used by public and private corporations."); with CAROLINE N. BROUN ET AL., THE
EVOLVING USE AND THE CHANGING ROLE OF INTERSTATE COMPACTS 53-54 (2006) ("The
status of compacts has been a source of conflicting thought over the years .... [I]t is
now widely accepted that congressionally approved compacts are 'federalized' [law]
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A separate indicator of this argument's failure is the outcome of
the Commission's previous motion for leave to file an original com-
plaint with the Supreme Court on its own. 167 Though the Court did
not give a definitive reason for the motion's denial, its highlighting of
the Solicitor General's argument 68 furthers the belief that the Court
views the Commission as a nonsovereign entity lacking the considera-
tion due a state. That fact, combined with the parallel defense of
intervention taken from Arizona, and the Eleventh Amendment denial
in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Forida169 for the Tribe to bring suit,170
make it likely that the Commission would be barred from bringing its
own suit. If the Seminole Tribe was not allowed to bring suit to
enforce a compact, a similarly-situated compact commission should
also be barred from doing so 171-especially given the fact that an
Indian tribe at least retains some measure of sovereignty. 172
The second argument that can be made on behalf of the Elev-
enth Amendment's not being violated is the similarity between the
suit before the Court and the suit that would have existed without the
Commission: the judicial power is not enlarged. This knotty issue is
actually the one on which the Court hangs its hat in the opinion. As
the argument goes, the parties are in court anyway and because there
is no extra burden, "'the Eleventh Amendment is not compro-
167 See supra note 121 and accompanying text. Allowing otherwise would have vio-
lated the law creating the compact. See 99 Stat. at 1873 ("The rights granted to the
party states by this compact are additional to the rights enjoyed by sovereign states,
and nothing in this compact shall be construed to infringe upon, limit, or abridge those rights."
(emphasis added)).
168 See Alabama, 130 S. Ct. at 2305.
169 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
170 See id. at 76 (holding that "[t]he Eleventh Amendment prohibit[ed] Congress
from making the State of Florida capable of being sued in federal court," even though
there was a statutory compact scheme in place providing for the state to be sued).
171 The majority could make use of Justice Souter's dissent in Seminole Tribe in
order to premise the intervention of the Commission on its federal question basis.
However, their denial of the Commission's right to bring suit on its own indicates an
understandable rejection of that "diversity theorist" line of argumentation.
172 See Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 755-56 (1998) ("We
have often noted, however, that the immunity possessed by Indian tribes is not coex-
tensive with that of the States. In Blatchford, we distinguished state sovereign immu-
nity from tribal sovereign immunity, as tribes were not at the Constitutional
Convention. They were thus not parties to the 'mutuality of. . .concession' that
'makes the States' surrender of immunity from suit by sister States plausible.' So tri-
bal immunity is a matter of federal law and is not subject to diminution by the States."
(alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Blatchford v. Native Vill. of
Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 782 (1991))).
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mised.' ",173 Additionally, if the judicial power is not actually enlarged,
the intervening party is not really prosecuting the case against the
state.1 74 Or, alternatively, since intervenors can be afforded fewer
rights than parties in interest, again, it is not actually the nonstate
party prosecuting the case. Since this argument is more complex, it
will require more careful rebuttal.
The Chief Justice first works to dispel the notion that the contro-
versy is not enlarged by adding intervenors. As argued previously,175 if
the claims are exactly the same, Supreme Court precedent counsels
against granting intervention because the claim is already adequately
represented 176 (or could even be enhanced through filing an amicus
brief) .177 If the claims, or even the manner in which they are
presented, 7 8 are different at all, the controversy is, by definition,
enlarged and the game is up. I 79 The Chief Justice's final attack is
proving enlargement of the controversy through highlighting what
the Commission gets by becoming a party. 180 Once the Commission
garners "stuff' as a party, it is difficult to maintain the majority's pri-
mary argument. Perhaps the best way to save this argument might be
to argue that North Carolina had waived its immunity with regard to
the Commission by agreeing to the Compact's terms. 181 However,
173 Alabama, 130 S. Ct. at 2314 (quoting Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 614
(1983)).
174 Lurking in the background here is a notion of supplemental jurisdiction that
allows the Court to dispose of the entire controversy at once.
175 See supra Parts II.C & III.A.
176 See New Jersey v. New York, 345 U.S. 369, 373 (1953).
177 See Alabama, 130 S. Ct. at 2319 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) ("If the Commission truly sought nothing for itself-other than 'a full exposi-
tion of the issues'-it could have participated as an amicus." (citation omitted) (quot-
ing the Preliminary Report of the Special Master at 14, Alabama v. North Carolina,
130 S. Ct. 2295 (2010) (No. 132), 2009 WL 4709541, at *14)).
178 See supra Part IL.C (discussing Trbovich).
179 See Alabama, 130 S. Ct. at 2319 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) ("It is ... impossible for the Court to hear private claims against a noncon-
senting State without expanding '[its] judicial power over the controversy.'" (quoting
Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 614 (1983)).
180 See id. ("As a party, the Commission enjoys legally enforceable rights against
the defendant State: It may object to settlement, seek taxation of costs, advance argu-
ments we are obliged to consider, and plead the judgment as res judicata in future
litigation.").
181 See GRESSMAN ET AL., supra note 5, at 625 ("Although 28 U.S.C. §1251 (b) (3)
speaks only in terms of actions 'by a State,' it is arguable that the Supreme Court also
enjoys original jurisdiction of suits against a state by citizens of different states or
aliens where a state has waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity. The failure of the
statute to address this possibility is not dispositive since the Constitution vests the
Court with original jurisdiction over all cases 'in which a State shall be Party,' and the
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waiver was not applicable in the case, 182 and the opinion established a
broader precedent for nonstate plaintiff intervention against which
the Chief Justice is arguing.
The final argument utilized to rebut the dissent is a reliance on
precedent and a prudential reticence to overturn it without argument
on the matter.183 Though the Court has not been bashful on previous
occasions about overturning precedent and deciding jurisdictional
issues raised sua sponte,'s4 perhaps it should be given the benefit of
the doubt for recognizing here that such moves may not always be
prudent. However, given the serious nature of the questions raised,
Court has stated repeatedly that Congress cannot diminish that jurisdiction." (quot-
ing U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2)).
182 See The State of North Carolina's Sur-Reply Brief at 22, Alabama, 130 S. Ct.
2295 (No. 132), 2009 WL 5945958, at *22 ("While Entergy [Arkansas, Inc. v. Nebraska,
241 F.3d 979 (8th Cir. 2001)] thus establishes that a State can waive its immunity by
joining a Compact that expressly authorizes its Commission to enforce its provisions
by suing member States in federal court, it also demonstrates indirectly why North
Carolina did not waive its immunity by entering into the Southeast Compact, which
includes no such enforcement provision.").
The Special Master for Alabama "assumed for the sake of argument that a State
possesses sovereign immunity against a claim brought by an entity, like the Commis-
sion, created by an interstate compact" before still recommending that the interven-
tion be allowed. Alabama, 130 S. Ct. at 2314. This position of the Special Master was
confirmed by the majority's holding that "[w]hile the Commission may not bring
[claims] in a stand-alone action under this Court's original jurisdiction, see §1251 (a),
it may assert them in this Court alongside the plaintiff States." Id. at 2316. The inter-
vention is allowed in spite of supposed immunity.
183 See Alabama, 130 S. Ct. at 2315 n.6. However, the Eleventh Amendment argu-
ment was raised on brief. See The State of North Carolina's Sur-Reply Brief, supra
note 182, at *1-19; Brief in Reply to North Carolina's Exceptions to the Preliminary
and Second Reports of the Special Master at 2-23, Alabama, 130 S. Ct. 2295 (No.
132), 2009 WL 4874106, at *2-23.
184 See, e.g., Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908) ("We
do not deem it necessary, however, to consider either of these questions, because, in
our opinion, the court below was without jurisdiction of the cause. Neither party has
questioned that jurisdiction, but it is the duty of this court to see to it that the jurisdic-
tion of the Circuit Court, which is defined and limited by statute, is not exceeded.
This duty we have frequently performed of our own motion." (emphasis added) (citing multi-
ple cases)).
The Court has actually been divided as to whether Eleventh Amendment ques-
tions are truly "subject matter jurisdiction" questions that should be decided on the
Court's own motion. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 107, at 883 ("The Court has taken
a range of positions on this issue, indicating, for example, in Edelman v. Jordan, 415
U.S. 651 (1974), that the matter is jurisdictional, but stating in Patsy v. Board of
Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 515-16 n. 19 (1982), that an Eleventh Amendment question is
not jurisdictional 'in the sense that it must be raised and decided by this Court on its
own motion.' More recently, in Wisconsin Dep't of Corrections v. Schacht, 524 U.S.
381, 391 (1998), the Court said that the issue has yet to be resolved.").
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perhaps the Court should have either resolved the issue on its own or
asked the parties to brief the matter before deciding.1I 5 And in real-
ity, it is not difficult to follow the Chief Justice's reasoning for why the
Arizona decision was "built on sand"186-the decision could have easily
been overturned or distinguished. Arizona bases its reasoning on a
single footnote in Maryland that completely missed the boat on the
issue of sovereign immunity and thus would have been easy to over-
rule.18 7 Alternatively, the Court could have held Arizona to be correct
on tribal sovereignty grounds but inapplicable here.1 18 At the least,
the Court could have distinguished Arizona by pointing out the
United States' involvement in the case and arguing that the parallel
claims of the Indian Tribes only represented those of the United
States.18 9 However, the bottom line here is that, if the Court lacked
jurisdiction, it was the Court's job to address that and decline the
Commission's motion.190
C. Alabama v. The Constitution
"If then, the courts are to regard the constitution, and the consti-
tution is superior to any ordinary [decision of the Supreme Court],
the constitution, and not such ordinary act, must govern the case to
which they both apply."' 91 Moving forward, it seems that it is Alabama,
185 See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICriON § 2.3.1, at 61 (5th ed. 2007)
("[If an issue] is jurisdictional, federal courts can raise it on their own and it may be
challenged at any point in the federal court proceedings." (emphasis added)). Con-
sidering the "grave nature" of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction, Eleventh
Amendment questions should be considered jurisdictional-at least for that docket.
186 Alabama, 130 S. Ct. at 2318 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part). "The relevant portion of that opinion is almost wholly unreasoned. It cites
only a footnote in a prior case, the pertinent paragraph of which failed even to discuss
the State's immunity from private suit. That paragraph addressed only intervention,
not sovereign immunity, and the two issues are distinct." Id. (citations omitted).
187 See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
188 See infra note 194.
189 The federal government is allowed to assign its claims for prosecution in fed-
eral court. Though qui tam actions are normally brought against individuals, the
same type of reasoning could be used to distinguish Arizona. See FALLON ET AL., supra
note 107, at 150. It could be argued that the federal nature of the Interstate Compact
Commission in Alabama creates a situation akin to assignment of a federal claim, but
that move would require assuming its validity prior to making the leap from there to
justification of nonstate intervention. Arizona involved actual claims already under
consideration rather than some implied ability to bring claims.
190 See Levi & Moore, supra note 116, at 910 ("A lack of real jurisdiction must be
taken account of by the court itself, and no matter how the question is raised, a court
will have to dismiss proceedings over which it lacks such jurisdiction.").
191 Adapted from Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 178 (1803).
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and maybe not Arizona, that should be overturned. In a way, footnote
six of the opinion (the majority's response to the dissent's argument)
is almost begging for the Court to revisit this issue; perhaps next time,
the Court will follow the ChiefJustice's logic and rule against allowing
nonstate plaintiff intervenors. Not because it violates Article III or
§ 1251, but because of the Eleventh Amendment's prohibition. 192
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ORIGINAL, ACTION
INTERVENTION JURISPRUDENCE
Recent decisions by the Supreme Court concerning nonstate
intervention in original actions have created jurisprudential inconsis-
tencies and require reform in order to avoid constitutional inadequa-
cies. Nonstate intervention qua intervention is a perfectly acceptable
form of case management, and nonstates have been parties to suits in
original actions of the Court from the beginning. Though the dissent
expressed doubts about the nonstate parties intervening as defendants
in South Carolina, it was within the constitutional discretion of the
Court to allow. The only thing needed at this point is a clear articula-
tion of the circumstances under which such parties will be
countenanced.
As an external restraint, however, the Eleventh Amendment
should prevent nonstate plaintiff intervenors such as the Commission
in Alabama-even if relief is completely precluded.193 The text and
history of the Amendment seem to be clear that states were not to be
sued by nonsovereign entities. 19 4 And it appears that intervenors
192 Cf Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 121 (1984)
("[N]either pendent jurisdiction nor any other basis ofjurisdiction may override the
Eleventh Amendment.").
193 It seems unlikely that relief would be denied altogether as there are several
options for bringing suit that circumvent the difficulties of the Eleventh Amendment.
One is a suit against "a state officer as defendant instead of the state government...
derived from English common law under which the King had sovereign immunity,
but other officials could be sued to remedy wrongs done by the government."
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 185, § 7.5.1, at 432; see also Tidmarsh, supra note 142, at
1178-79 ("First, as a statement of fundamental American law, the 'no right without a
remedy' principle has never been absolute. Second, and relatedly, the various reme-
dies that I have already listed-Ex parte Young injunctions, federal enforcement, and
damages suits against responsible state officials-are significant, even if not equally
effective; the Marbuiy 'no right without a remedy' principle has never been under-
stood to require that the most effective remedy is constitutionally compelled.").
Another solution might be to sue the United States, as shown in previous original
action cases. See supra Part I.B.
194 This interpretation of state sovereign immunity (adopted by the Court) makes
sense because of federalism concerns. It should be up to the states to decide, to a
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clearly have enough party status to fall within the ambit of the Amend-
ment. A serious consideration is that, if nonstate plaintiff intervenors
are allowed and the other parties drop their suits or settle, the Court
could end up with the exact type of suit that it has acknowledged pre-
viously is unconstitutional-a nonsovereign entity suing a state.
This external restraint loomed over the decision in Alabama and
played a role in the formation of its inconsistent intervention stan-
dard. 95 There appear to be two possible solutions to this. The first is
that the new language of the standard could be treated as dicta in
future cases even though it seems to represent the holding of the
Court. 196 The second would be to overturn Alabama and return to the
discretionary standard from New Jersey'97 echoed in South Carolina.198
The Court obviously must walk a fine line here, and the balance
large extent, when and where they will be sued-not individual citizens. However,
though it is beyond the scope of this Note, I would argue that Indian Tribes, espe-
cially given their quasi-sovereign nature, should not be barred by the Eleventh
Amendment from prosecuting suits against states, contra Seminole Tribe. Prior to the
Blatchford decision, the Ninth Circuit correctly "concluded that the consent of the
states to suit in federal court by Indian tribes was 'inherent in the constitutional
plan.'" AMERICAN INDIAN LAw DESKBOOK 229 (Clay Smith et al. eds., 4th ed. 2008)
(quoting Native Vill. of Noatak v. Hoffman, 896 F.2d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 1990), rev'd
sub nom. Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775 (1991)). However, the
Supreme Court subsequently held that the Tribes were not parties to the "mutuality
of ... concession" that "makes the States' surrender of immunity from suit by sister
States plausible." Blatchford, 501 U.S. at 782.
There are two easily recognizable responses that rebut this contention: First, it
seems a little disingenuous to absorb a sovereign entity after making certain arrange-
ments and then penalize them for not being present when the arrangements were
made, since they were not planning on joining the group in the first place. Second,
by virtue of the United States absorbing sovereign Indian Nations, the claims of the
Tribes should either be seen as those of the United States (as it seems may have been
the case in Arizona), or the states should be presumed to have waived sovereign immu-
nity with respect to the Tribes as they have with respect to the federal government.
195 See supra Part II.C (highlighting the difficulty reconciling South Carolina with
Alabama and pointing to a need for consistency moving forward).
196 The focus of the Court on not enlarging the controversy was assumed to be
acceptable as long as no extra burden was placed on the state to defend claims
brought by the intervenor. This new standard, presumably the holding in order to
allow intervention in the case, is what ChiefJustice Roberts referred to as "'no harm,
no foul' jurisdiction." Alabama v. North Carolina, 130 S. Ct. 2295, 2317 (2010) (Rob-
erts, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
197 See supra Part II.A. The intervenor must show "some compelling interest in his
own right, apart from his interest in a class with all other citizens and creatures of the
state, which interest is not properly represented by the state." NewJersey v. New York,
345 U.S. 369, 373 (1953).
198 See supra note 115 and accompanying text. The language almost exactly tracks
New Jersey.
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between maintaining fairness and opening the floodgates in these
matters is delicate. In a normal case, if a claim will not adequately be
represented by another party, an entity should be allowed to intervene
"of right."199 Yet all nonstate party intervention in original actions
between states is discretionary.200 Indeed, any nonstate party is only
ever before the Supreme Court as a matter of judicial grace-original
jurisdiction for nonsovereigns, even in suits with States, is not exclu-
sive. Alabama took the standard too far and should be overturned any-
way for reasons discussed in Part III. The New Jersey standard 20 I
captures the balance between fairness and not offending the grave
nature of the Court's original jurisdiction; Alabama v. North Carolina
simply extended the logic further than necessary in an attempt to
account for its Eleventh Amendment shortcomings.
One could charge that allowing nonstate defendant intervenors
while preventing plaintiffs creates an inconsistency due to the exis-
tence of counterclaims, etc. 20 2 After all, do the counterclaims not cre-
ate instances of claim prosecution against the state? However,
because the defendant is not the one who instigated the lawsuit, it
seems patently unfair to prevent claims that could afterward be pre-
cluded. Though a circuit split exists on this issue, 20 3 if a state insti-
gates a suit where potential defendant intervenors can come in, it is
no longer comprehensible that they should be able to hide behind
199 See Moore & Levi, supra note 19, at 591 ("[W]here a petitioner is represented
in a proceeding, he will be bound by a decree of the court, whether he can show an
interest in property or not. It, therefore, becomes even more important that the right
to intervene be absolute if the representation is shown to be inadequate.").
200 See McKusick, supra note 13, at 189 ("In managing its original jurisdiction
docket, the Supreme Court does not consider itself bound to follow what it has itself
called a 'time-honored maxim of the Anglo-American common-law tradition' that a
trial court generally must hear and decide any and all lawsuits that fall within its juris-
diction." (quoting Ohio v. Wyandotte Chems. Corp., 401 U.S. 493, 496-97 (1971))).
201 The New Jersey standard was endorsed by both the majority and dissent in South
Carolina. See South Carolina v. North Carolina, 130 S. Ct. 854, 867 (2010); id. at 870
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting). The disagreement there stemmed from the standard's
application, in an apportionment suit, to a nonsovereign entity.
202 See Levi & Moore, supra note 116, at 919 ("The right of an intervener to press
an affirmative claim against the plaintiff goes to the very heart of the intervener's
status.").
203 See FALLON ET AL., supra note 107, at 883 ("When a state files suit in federal
court, it necessarily waives its sovereign immunity from the court's jurisdiction to
determine the validity of its claims and of any defenses that might be asserted against
those claims. The circuits are divided on whether a state's voluntary appearance as a
plaintiff in federal court waives the state's sovereign immunity with respect to compul-
sory (or permissive) counterclaims . . . ." (citation omitted)).
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the shield of sovereign immunity. In these circumstances, it is entirely
fair to say that the state has waived any immunity.20 4
CONCLUSION
Intervention in original actions of the Supreme Court is primarily
discretionary. According to that prerogative, the Court chose to allow
nonstate, nonsovereign defendants to intervene in South Carolina v.
North Carolina. The extension of that privilege to nonstate, nonsover-
eign plaintiffs in Alabama v. North Carolina, however, not only created
a potentially inconsistent standard for intervention but also violated
the Eleventh Amendment. The Court should revisit Alabama in the
future and heed the Chief Justice's admonition.
204 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 185, § 7.6, at 453 ("Although allowing such waiv-
ers seems inconsistent with viewing the Eleventh Amendment as a restriction on the
federal courts' subject matter jurisdiction, it is firmly established that 'if a State waives
its immunity and consents to suit in federal court, the Eleventh Amendment does not
bar the action.' Permitting states to waive their Eleventh Amendment immunity
reflects the close relationship between the amendment and sovereign immunity."
(quoting Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238 (1985))).
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